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When someone says something, he or she expresses a certain content, and knows 
which content it is that he or she expresses. That is the substance of my ‘Availability 
Principle’. I use it in support of a broadly contextualist approach to linguistic content ; 
for the content that is delivered compositionally through the semantics of the 
language, irrespective of pragmatic considerations, is either too incomplete to count 
as content (in the genuine, truth-evaluable sense), or, if complete, lies at a level of 
abstraction that makes it unavailable to the users of the language. 
As Frapolli notes, four (related) phenomena, or rather, four distinct facets of a 
single phenomenon — a phenomenon which plays quite a central role in my 
philosophy of language — seem to give the lie to the Availability principle : 
 
• According to Externalism (a view which I accept) the content of our thoughts 
depends upon the external environment and not merely upon what’s ‘in the head’ of 
the thinker ; it follows that subjects « do not, in general, ‘know’ the propositional 
contents of the representations which they accept » (Recanati 2000 : 275). This 
apparently contradicts the Availability Principle. 
• Indexicality is a pervasive feature of both thought and speech, in virtue of which the 
content of our words and mental representations depends upon the context in which 
they are tokened. It follows that one may be unaware of what one says or thinks, 
insofar as the content of one’s speech or thought depends upon contextual factors of 
which one may be unaware. 
• Through quotational deference, it is possible to use words with the content they 
have for someone else, even if one does not know what that content is. Thus I may 
believe what the teacher tells me, namely, that Cicero’s prose is full of ‘synecdoches’, 
even if I haven’t quite understood what synecdoches are. 
• Sometimes we speak as if we possessed concepts which we do not actually master 
but which are part of the intellectual endowment of the community to which we 
belong. This is the phenomenon known as imperfect mastery. Thanks to the social 
nature of language, we help ourselves to conceptual resources which are beyond our 
individual ken. 
 
In Oratio  Obliqua, Oratio  Recta and elsewhere I pointed out that there is a 
close connection between quotational deference and incomplete mastery. In both 
cases, arguably, we defer to other members of the linguistic community. But in 
quotational deference we defer deliberately and consciously ; no so in the other type 
of case. In incomplete mastery the subject need not be aware of his or her 
predicament. The type of deference at issue is more surreptitious and automatic than 
quotational deference. 
There is also a close connection between indexicality and Externalism ; a 
connection emphasized by Putnam in his pioneering papers on the topic. Like 
Putnam, I think that Externalism can be construed as the thesis that our concepts 
have a demonstrative component. ‘Water’ refers to that stuff to be found in lakes and 
rivers around us (etc.), hence the reference of our water-concept depends upon the 
environment, much as the reference of a demonstrative does. The stereotype 
associated with a natural kind term, or whatever fixes the reference of the term for us, 
does not do so by providing necessary and sufficient conditions but by enabling us, in 
context, to identify local paradigms whose real nature is what ultimately determines 
the extension of the term. 
Finally, I hold that deference itself (in its two forms : quotational deference and 
incomplete mastery) can be viewed as a form of indexicality, broadly construed. 
When deferentially used, an expression acquires a specific, deferential ‘character’, in 
virtue of which it expresses the same ‘content’, in context, as the content the 
expression has for the person or persons to whom the speaker defers, given the 
character that expression has for the person or persons in question. The Kaplanian 
framework with its distinction between character and content can be used to deal with 
the facts of deference in a straightforward manner, and it is that indexical treatment 
which I advocate in my critical discussion of Sperber’s views. 
The indexical theory of deference enables us to achieve the unification of the 
four phenomena listed above. As I said at the beginning, they are best construed as 
facets of a single phenomenon. Yet there are differences between the facets, and 
they loom large when it comes to evaluating the alleged inconsistency between (due 





Regarding the connection between Externalism and indexicality, Frapolli sides with 
Burge who, in ‘Other Bodies’, downplays the connection emphasized by Putnam. 
Although I side with Putnam in this debate, I concede that there is an important 
difference between, say, natural kind or substance concepts (‘water’, ‘tiger’) and 
ordinary demonstrative concepts (‘that water’, ‘that tiger’).1 This difference I have 
tried to cash out in terms of the distinction between the normal context in which a 
concept acquires its content and the actual context in which the concept is used and 
applied. The reference of a natural kind or substance concept depends upon the 
normal context (so ‘water’ does not refer to the same thing for us and for the 
inhabitants of Twin-Earth), while the reference of an ordinary demonstrative concept 
depends upon the actual context (so ‘that tiger’ refers to different tigers in different 
contexts). The actual context is much more local than the normal context. The normal 
context is the world in which we live and with which we causally interact ; while the 
actual context is the local situation (a small chunk of the world) in which the concept 
happens to be tokened. 
This difference in locality matters greatly to the issue at hand. For us, the 
normal context is given: we live on Earth (where H20 is what descends from the sky 
as rain, etc.) hence our concepts have whatever content they have, in a more or less 
stable manner. The environment-dependence of content has no practical 
consequence for us because the external factors upon which content depends do not 
change (except in the counterfactual circumstances imagined by the philosophers). 
Only their actual variation would be a threat to Availability, because it would entail 
that a change of content might not be detected by the subject. Since the external 
factors do not actually vary, there is no undetected variability of content, hence no 
                                            
1 I say ‘ordinary demonstrative concepts’ because natural kind concepts can 
themselves be construed as demonstrative concepts referring to properties (the 
property of being water, the property of being a tiger) or to substances or kinds 
(water, tiger). 
threat to Availability. 
To be sure, there is a sense in which subjects can be said not to ‘know’ the 
propositional contents of the representations which they accept, since those contents 
depend upon environmental factors of which they need not be aware ; but there is 
also a clear sense in which they do know the contents of their beliefs. Contextualists 
in epistemology have emphasized how variable the conditions of satisfaction of 
‘know’ are according to the changing standards which happen to be set in context. 
Just as there is no real contradiction between Everyman’s claim to knowledge and 
the philosopher’s scepticism, there is no contradiction between the externalist’s claim 
that subjects do not know the contents of the representations they accept, and the 
Availability principle, according to which they know the contents of the beliefs they 




The relative stability of content which makes Externalism consistent with Availability 
is due to the non-local  character of the normal context on which content 
externalistically depends. This is in contrast to the actual context of tokening, on 
which the content of ordinary demonstrative thoughts depends ; for that context is 
local and eminently variable. I say ‘That tiger is tamed’ but unbeknown to be, the 
context has changed : the tiger I was looking at and thought I was pointing to 
(Marius, say) has been replaced by another, untamed one (Totor). Unwittingly, I say 
that Totor is tamed. In this case I am mistaken as to the content expressed by my 
own words. (I think I am referring to Marius, while I am referring to Totor.) Because 
the context upon which the content of our ordinary indexical thoughts depends is a 
local context, there is a real possibility of being mistaken as to the content of our own 
thoughts ; hence there is a stronger sense in which we do not know the contents of 
our thoughts, than the sense in which that is so simply in virtue of Externalism. 
Ordinary indexicality, therefore, poses a genuine threat to  Availability. With 
deference the situation is even worse. Whenever the speaker defers to someone else 
in her use of a term, what content she turns out to express depends upon what is in 
the head of those people to whom she defers. The deferrer herself is not in control, 
by definition : only the deferee, or someone who can read the deferee’s mind,  knows 
what is being said. Deference and Availability therefore stand in sharp conflict, as 
Frapolli points out. 
 To get out of the contradiction spotted by Frapolli, what can I do or say ? As 
Frapolli herself suggests, I can appeal to an innovation introduced in Literal Meaning 
in order to qualify the Availability Principle and make it more accurate. The alleged 
counterexamples to Availability are cases in which, admittedly, the subject does not 
quite know the content of what s/he is saying ; yet they are not really 
counterexamples to the Availability Principle, as it is formulated in Literal Meaning. 
There I say that the content of our utterances is fixed by the intuitions of normal 
interpreters. The speaker’s intentions etc. fix the content of his or her utterance — a 
content which must therefore be available to him or her — only insofar as the 
speaker, in the context, counts as a ‘normal interpreter’. This proviso is sufficient to 
dispose of the counterexamples to Availability based on deference or indexicality. 
Normal interpreters are, by definition, people who know the language (they 
understand the words that are used) and the relevant contextual facts (e.g. they do 
not commit indexical errors such as mistaking the person or thing pointed to for 
someone or something else). By thus restricting Availability to normal interpreters, we 
get rid of the alleged counterexamples : 
 
Ordinary users of the language are normal interpreters, in most situations. 
They know the relevant facts and have the relevant abilities. But there are 
situations… where the actual users make mistakes and are not normal 
interpreters. In such situations their interpretations do not fix what is said. To 
determine what is said, we need to look at the interpretation which a normal 
interpreter would give. (Literal Meaning, p. 20). 
 
After considering this way out, Frapolli notes that my framework, as it stands, 
cannot accommodate it. According to Externalism, imperfect mastery permeates 
language and thought. That is something I accept. Now I hold that imperfect mastery 
is a form of deference. If, therefore, I assume that deferrers are not normal 
interpreters, so that Availability fails for them, then I am bound to accept that ‘the 
availability principle fails for the most part of our use of language’ — hardly a 
welcome consequence ! In order to avoid that consequence, Frapolli says, I must 
change the framework and ‘treat apart deferentiality and imperfect mastery’. 
Frapolli’s objection is well-taken ; there is a problem indeed. But the problem 
has a solution (close to what she herself suggests). Remember the distinction 
between the normal context, whose stability makes Externalism compatible with 
Availability, and the local context upon which the content of indexical thoughts (or 
utterances) depends. That distinction applies within the realm of deference. For we 
may consider, with Putnam and Burge, that the normal context (the environment) 
upon which content externalistically depends has a social dimension. The content of 
the word ‘arthritis’, whoever uses it, depends upon the linguistic practice of the 
community : that practice is an aspect of the normal context upon which the content 
of the word ‘arthritis’ depends. Insofar as the normal context (with its social 
dimension) is stable, that form of deference — the form which permeates language 
and thought — does not threaten Availability. The only genuine threat to Availability 
comes from the cases in which the target of the speaker’s act of deference is local 
and variable, namely the cases of quotational deference. In quotational deference, as 
opposed to incomplete mastery, the actual context of the tokening determines who, in 
particular, the speaker is deferring to (e.g. the teacher, in the synecdoche example). 
Now those cases are sufficiently marginal to be excluded from the application of the 
Availability Principle, without making it vacuous. In contrast, we should not exclude 
cases of incomplete mastery from its application. When I say that speakers normally 
know what it is that they are saying, I mean that they know it in a sense that is 
compatible with the fact that, because of social externalism and imperfect mastery, 
virtually no one really ‘knows’ what he is talking about. Again there are different 
standards for knowledge, hence there is no real incompatibility between imperfect 
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